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The drive to reduce carbon dioxide emissions has led many countries to invest 
heavily in wind turbines. At the currently low level of penetration, fluctuations in wind 
power output that result from changing weather conditions can easily be managed 
using existing arrangements. However, as the share of wind power in the overall 
generation mix increases, variations in output of wind turbine generators are likely to 
cause large fluctuations in electricity prices and may compromise system stability. 
 
One commonly suggested solution is to strengthen electrical connections between 
neighbouring regions, so that uncorrelated shocks in those regions can at least 
partly offset one another. The recently completed 700MW merchant interconnector 
between South Norway and the Netherlands, known as NorNed, is a particularly 
interesting case study in this regard. It connects a market characterised by price 
shocks due to changing demand and fuel prices to one which is dominated by 
reservoir generation, where generators arbitrage away significant price fluctuations. 
In theory, a reservoir system can act as a battery when connected to a system with a 
fluctuating electricity price, importing and storing electricity when the electricity price 
in the neighbouring system is low and running down its stocks when the price in the 
neighbouring system is high. 
 
Much of the existing work on this topic seems to suggest that private investment in 
interconnector capacity is likely to be below the socially optimal level because of 
economies of scale in building transmission cables. It is claimed that the marginal 
investment decision is distorted by the effect of additional investment on profits from 
existing transmission capacity. The argument is equivalent to the 
explanation of why monopoly output is below the competitive level. 
Increasing transmission capacity reduces price differences between 
markets, driving down the profits of existing transmission capacity. 
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Since economies of scale in transmission investment mean that it cannot be 
provided competitively, i.e. in small increments by different parties, the actual 
capacity built is likely to be below the socially optimum level. 
 
This paper takes an empirical approach to examining the economic effects of 
NorNed. It concludes that arbitrage over the interconnector has had a low effect on 
prices in the Netherlands and South Norway. This implies that the majority of welfare 
gains resulting from trade across the interconnector are likely to be accrued to its 
owners, undermining the practical validity of the theoretical argument that 
economies of scale in transmission investment lead to a divergence between social 
and private benefits of transmission investment. On the scale of NorNed, there is 
little evidence to suggest that transmission capacity between different markets 
cannot be provided competitively.  
 
The paper also estimates the effect of arbitrage over NorNed on price volatility in the 
Dutch day-ahead electricity market. It finds little support for the proposition that 
merchant interconnectors with capacity similar to that of NorNed can achieve a 
substantial reduction of price volatility in the connected markets. Given that NorNed 
connects the Dutch market to a reservoir system characterised by stable prices, 
NorNed represents an upper bound on such capability for interconnectors of its size. 
This suggests that the effectiveness of interconnectors in reducing price fluctuations 
caused by changing wind power output in a system otherwise dominated by thermal 
power generators may have been overstated and capacity considerably greater than 
that of NorNed may be required to achieve the desired effect. 
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This paper estimates the effect of the merchant interconnector between 
Norway and the Netherlands on the level and residual volatility of hourly 
day-ahead electricity prices in the two connected markets. The price 
effects are estimated using single equation ARMA models and the 
volatility effects are estimated using EGARCH models with multiplicative 
heteroskdasticity. Both the level and volatility effects on prices are found 
to be modest. This result implies that the majority of welfare gains 
resulting from trade across the interconnector are likely to be accrued to 
its owners, undermining the practical validity of the theoretical argument 
that lumpiness in transmission investment leads to a divergence 
between social and private benefits of transmission investment. This 
paper finds that, on the scale of NorNed, there is little evidence to 
suggest that transmission capacity between different markets cannot be 
provided competitively.  
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1 Introduction
The drive to reduce carbon dioxide emissions has led many countries to invest heavily in wind
turbines. Whilst the share of wind power in total world generation is only around 1.5% as of
2008, this share had doubled between 2005 and 20081. At the currently low level of penetration,
fluctuations in wind power output that result from changing weather conditions can easily be
managed using existing arrangements. However, as the share of wind power in the overall gen-
eration mix increases, variations in output of wind turbine generators are likely to cause large
fluctuations in electricity prices and may compromise system stability.
One commonly suggested solution is to strengthen electrical connections between neighbour-
ing regions, so that uncorrelated shocks in those regions can at least partly offset one another.
The recently completed 700MW merchant2 interconnector between South Norway and the Nether-
lands, known as NorNed, is a particularly interesting case study in this regard. It connects a mar-
ket characterised by price shocks due to changing demand and fuel prices to one which is dom-
inated by reservoir generation, where generators arbitrage away significant price fluctuations.
∗I would first of all like to thank my supervisor, David Newbery, for providing the inspiration for this paper and for
reading and discussing the numerous drafts that landed on his desk. I would also like to thank Arina Nikandrova
for helping me to get to grips with some of the econometric models used in the paper and for coming up with
suggestions that made the progress of my work so much smoother. Finally, I would like to thank Nicholas Vasilakos,
Michael Pollitt, Steve Satchell and the anonymous referee for commenting on and helping to improve this paper at
the various stages of its development.
1"World Wind Energy Report 2008," World Wind Energy Association (Feb. 2009)
2The capacity to transmit power over NorNed is auctioned in the day-ahead market
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In theory, a reservoir system can act as a battery when connected to a system with a fluctuating
electricity price, importing and storing electricity when the electricity price in the neighbouring
system is low and running down its stocks when the price in the neighbouring system is high.
The resulting gains from trade would likely be even greater when a power system with a signif-
icant proportion of wind generation is connected to a reservoir system. Because output from
wind turbines is highly variable, the benefits from storing surplus wind energy when it is abun-
dant and drawing on reserves when it is scarce are likely to be very high. Whilst a similar effect
can be achieved by relying on reserves of thermal generation capacity in periods when wind en-
ergy is scarce, this may be a lot more expensive than building additional transmission capacity.
Generally, economic gains from connections between neighbouring electricity markets can come
from two sources. Firstly, there could be a consistent difference between prices in the two con-
nected markets. Secondly, since electricity prices in day ahead markets are generally volatile,
economic gains can be realised without a consistent difference in prices. If price shocks in
the two connected markets are not perfectly correlated, an interconnector can be a substitute
for peaking generation capacity in both markets. Since interconnector capacity can be used
to arbitrage price differences between connected markets, private investors should be able to
recoup their investment through price arbitrage. However, much of the existing work on this
topic seems to suggest that private investment in interconnector capacity is likely to be below
the socially optimal level because of economies of scale in building transmission cables. This is
discussed in more detail below.
The most often cited papers that deal with the economic effects of connecting different elec-
tricity markets via high capacity cables have been theoretical rather than empirical. They tend
to treat the formation of prices as a deterministic process and derive static oligopoly equilib-
rium outcomes in the presence on an interconnector. This applies to Joskow and Tirole (2000),
who show that allowing generators to hold physical rights to transmission capacity may give
them the incentive to create network congestion. It is also true of Borenstein et al. (2000), who
model the effects of connecting two identical monopolistic electricity markets with determin-
istic demand and constant marginal cost on the behaviour of incumbent monopolists. Their
model predicts that when the capacity of the transmission line is above a certain threshold, the
two firms act as a duopoly and prices in both markets are lower than the monopoly price. This
happens without any power flowing through the interconnector, which is a direct consequence
of perfect symmetry between the two markets. From this result, the authors conclude that the
social value of transmission capacity may not be closely related to the actual flows of electricity
across the interconnector.
One theoretical paper that is closer in spirit to this one is Joskow and Tirole (2005). It studies
interconnectors in a dynamic setting by examining the decision to invest in transmission capac-
ity. The authors argue that private investment in transmission capacity is likely to be below the
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socially optimal level due to lumpiness in transmission investment. The marginal investment
decision is distorted by the effect of additional investment on profits from existing transmission
capacity. The argument is equivalent to the explanation of why monopoly output is below the
competitive level. Increasing transmission capacity reduces price differences between markets,
driving down the profits of existing transmission capacity. Since lumpiness in transmission in-
vestment means that it cannot be provided competitively, i.e. in small increments by different
parties, the actual capacity built is likely to be below the socially optimum level.
The same argument is also employed in papers that straddle the line between theoretical and
empirical work on the economics of interconnectors. De Jong and Hakvoort (2006) use a sim-
ple calibrated supply and demand model to predict that socially optimal transmission capac-
ity is likely to be double the capacity that would maximise profits for a merchant transmission
investor. Brunekreeft (2003) also makes the argument that, because of economies of scale in
transmission investment, private provision of transmission capacity would be below first-best.
However, quoting statistics on the relationship between total transmission capacity and average
cost, Brunekreeft notes that, for interconnectors with capacity upwards of 750MW, economies
of scale are likely to be minor. Finally, Newbery (2006) deals directly with the issue of the impact
of interconnectors on price levels and volatility with respect to the 1,000MW interconnector be-
tween the UK and the Netherlands, which is under construction at the time of writing. There,
the estimated profits from the proposed interconnector are halved after accounting for its effect
on price levels and volatility in the connected markets.
This paper takes an empirical approach to examining the economic effects of NorNed. By esti-
mating its effect on the level of day-ahead electricity prices in the Netherlands and South Nor-
way, it helps to characterise the economic gains attributable to the interconnector. It concludes
that arbitrage has had a low effect on prices in the Netherlands and a slightly greater effect on
prices in South Norway. This result is surprising in two respects. Firstly, NorNed could be ex-
pected to have a significant effect on prices in the Netherlands given that short-run price elas-
ticity of demand for electricity tends to be low and the capacity of NorNed is equal to approxi-
mately 5% of average total available generation capacity in the Netherlands. Secondly, electricity
is a storable commodity in a reservoir system and flows over NorNed would not be expected to
impact South Norway prices immediately. Instead, that effect would be expected to be spread
across a large number of hours. Hence the effect of exports from South Norway on the price in
that market would be expected to at least partly offset the effect of imports into South Norway
in other hours. Since this kind of dynamic is not possible in a market characterised exclusively
by thermal generation and both the Netherlands and South Norway electricity markets are sim-
ilar in size, the effect of arbitrage over NorNed on South Norway prices could be expected to be
considerably lower than on prices in the Netherlands.
These results imply that the majority of welfare gains resulting from trade across the intercon-
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nector are likely to be accrued to its owners, undermining the practical validity of the theoretical
argument that lumpiness in transmission investment leads to a divergence between social and
private benefits of transmission investment. On the scale of NorNed, there is little evidence
to suggest that transmission capacity between different markets cannot be provided competi-
tively. The question of whether this result is at least partly due to the failure to implement mar-
ket coupling with respect to NorNed or the response of incumbent generators and any resulting
implications for market power in the Dutch electricity market are left for future research.
This paper also estimates the effect of arbitrage over NorNed on price volatility in the Dutch day-
ahead electricity market. It finds little support for the proposition that merchant interconnec-
tors with capacity similar to that of NorNed can achieve a substantial reduction of price volatility
in the connected markets. Given that NorNed connects the Dutch market to a reservoir system
characterised by stable prices, NorNed represents an upper bound on such capability for inter-
connectors of its size. This suggests that the effectiveness of interconnectors in reducing price
fluctuations caused by changing wind power output in a system otherwise dominated by ther-
mal power generators may have been overstated and capacity considerably greater than that of
NorNed may be required to achieve the desired effect.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data set. Section 3 goes
through the methodology used in estimating the price level effect of NorNed. Section 4 sets
out and interprets the results of this estimation exercise and extends that analysis to test how
the price effect of NorNed varies with market conditions. In particular, it tests whether the price
effect of NorNed is stronger during peak hours when spare generation capacity is scarce. Section
5 sets out a model of volatility in electricity markets and how this model is used to estimate the
effect of NorNed on residual volatility. Section 6 presents and interprets the results of volatility
analysis and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
The span of the data set is between 01 January 2006 and 12 March 2009. This is chosen delib-
erately so as to include sufficient observations before and after 6 May 2008 when NorNed was
activated and enable a fair before and after comparison. The analysis presented in this paper re-
lies on high frequency hourly data wherever possible, resulting in 28,008 separate observations
for every such variable. When hourly observations are not available, average daily or weekly val-
ues are entered for each hour of the corresponding day or week. A full list of variables and their
descriptions is given in Appendix B.
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Hourly log Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX) and log South Norway day ahead electricity prices
are the dependent variables in the analysis presented here and their properties are described in
detail at the end of this section. The South Norway nodal price is deemed to be more appropriate
than the Nord Pool3 system price because the former is the price at which any imports from the
Netherlands would be sold and any exports to the Netherlands would be paid for. The Nord Pool
system price and the South Norway nodal price are only equal when none of the transmission
constraints within the Nord Pool area are binding4. Day ahead rather than spot prices are used
because the vast majority of trades occur in the day ahead market. The auction for transmission
rights over NorNed is likewise conducted one day ahead of those rights being exercised.
Log coal and gas prices represent the determinants of the cost of generating electricity from
those fuels. The log EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) price also reflects part of the cost of
generating electricity from fossil fuels. Natural logarithms of all sample price data, including
electricity and fuel prices, are taken for the purposes of econometric analysis. This is done in
order to linearise any non-linear relationships in the data and results in a distribution which
resembles a normal more than a log normal. Histograms of the two log electricity price series
may be seen in Appendix A.
Hourly and week-day dummies are introduced to account for regular variations in demand be-
tween different hours of the day and different days of the week. The dummy variable for public
holidays accounts for lower demand during those days. Monthly dummies account for seasonal
variations in demand, and in the case of South Norway, seasonal variations in reservoir levels,
which determine generators’ willingness to supply electricity. The latter effect is also accounted
for directly by variables that capture the average historic reservoir levels in Norway for any given
week5 together with variables that capture the difference between average historic and actual
reservoir levels.
Weather observations play a dual role. For the Netherlands, average wind speed observations
account for the influence of wind generators on the system price and average daily temperature
observations account for the components of electricity demand related to heating. For South
Norway, temperature observations also play a similar role. However, both temperature and pre-
cipitation observations are instruments for reservoir levels, which determine the willingness of
hydro generators to supply electricity. Thus daily weather observation may capture some infor-
mation that is missed by average weekly reservoir level observations.
3Single power market for Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland
4In the 28 months prior to NorNed coming online, the South Norway nodal price was the same as the Nord Pool
system price 18% of the time. In the 10 months after that date, this proportion was only 2.6%.
5Averaged for the period between 1990 and 2003
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The variable that captures flows over the NorNed interconnector, measured in units of 100MW6,
is added to each regression together with a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when NorNed
is operational and 0 otherwise. This is done to make sure that the estimated effect of trading over
NorNed on log APX and South Norway prices is not biased by changes to the log electricity price
that are not directly attributable to NorNed during the period after its opening. The variable that
takes a value of 1 when NorNed is operational and 0 otherwise captures the effect of NorNed on
residual price volatility in the two regressions. This variable is employed in the models that
specify multiplicative heteroskedasticity.
Whilst the degree of market power in the Dutch and Norwegian electricity markets is one of the
key determinants of prices, there have been no significant changes in market structure in these
markets in the last four years, which covers the length of the sample period. This means that
the measured level of market power is likely to remain broadly the same for the duration of the
sample period and adding a measure of market power into a time series regression would simply
mean that it drops into the constant7. Measures of market power are therefore omitted from the
analysis presented in this paper.
Figure 1 plots average weekly APX and South Norway prices for the entire sample period. A plot
of the average weekly APX gas price is added as a benchmark for the APX electricity price. Like
electricity prices, this is also quoted in €/MWh for comparability.
6The variable is not weighted by demand as this would make it endogenous to the price. Section 4.4 provides
evidence to suggest that the effect of NorNed on the APX price is not significantly different in peak and off-peak
hours.
7NorNed would add a competitive fringe to the importing market, thus reducing market power in that market.
This effect could be expected to be captured by the variable representing flows over NorNed.
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Figure 1: Average weekly prices
APX and South Norway prices can be seen to be following a broadly similar trend around 50% of
the time, with significant deviations lasting several months at a time. APX prices are higher and
more volatile than South Norway prices almost throughout the sample period. After the activa-
tion of NorNed, there appears to be some convergence between APX prices and South Norway
prices. However, it does not occur immediately and, as can clearly be seen from the graph, APX
and South Norway prices have tended to be close to one another more often than not. Hence
the apparent convergence may be attributable to other factors. Given the prevalence of gas tur-
bine generators in the Netherlands, one would expect a significant relationship between APX
gas and electricity prices. They appear to be highly correlated in the long run. However, most of
the short run volatility in average weekly APX prices seems to be explained by other factors.
Figure 2 characterises the average daily pattern of APX and South Norway prices throughout the
sample period.
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Figure 2: Daily pattern of electricity prices
The pattern of significantly higher prices during peak hours is considerably more pronounced in
APX prices than in South Norway prices, where this pattern is barely visible. This is consistent
with the effect of a high proportion of reservoir generation in Norway. Reservoir generators
would be expected to arbitrage any consistent and significant intra-day variation in prices.
A simple visual test of the effect of NorNed on price differences between the two market is to
plot the average hourly difference between the APX price and the South Norway price before
and after NorNed coming online8. This is given in Figure 3 below. Two things become apparent
by observation. The first is that the average price difference has increased since NorNed came
online compared to the 26 months in the run-up to that date. The second is that the daily pattern
of price differences has remained remarkably similar after the activation of NorNed.
8This is calculated by subtracting the South Norway price from the APX price.
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Figure 3: Average hourly price difference
3 Estimating the price level effects of NorNed
3.1 Methodology
The purpose of this section is to determine the best method for estimating the effect of NorNed
on prices in the two connected regions and then to carry out that estimation. The analysis pro-
ceeds by adopting the simplest possible technique to begin with and then subsequently refining
that technique if it is found to be inadequate. The first step is to fit two linear regressions to the
data, with log APX and South Norway electricity prices as the dependent variables, and then
examine the residuals from those regressions to see if they satisfy the Gauss-Markov conditions.
The condition of zero autocorrelation in the residuals is found to be violated with respect to both
sets of residuals, though the null hypothesis of a unit root in log APX or South Norway price is
also rejected. In order to deal with the specification error that produces this autocorrelation,
a model with an autoregressive error structure is adopted. Finally, the variable that represents
electricity flows across the NorNed interconnector is tested for potential simultaneity bias. Test
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results show that such bias is unlikely to be present in the coefficients estimated by the ARMA
model.
3.2 Gauss-Markov conditions
If a time series regression equation is given by
yt =
K∑
i=1
xi tβi +εt ,
the Gauss-Markov assumptions in the context of this regression state that:
1. E(εt )= 0,
2. Cov(εs ,εt )= 0, i.e. the residuals are not autocorrelated, and
3. Var(εt )=σ2 <∞, i.e. the residuals are homoskedastic with a finite variance.
Assuming for the time being that the above conditions are satisfied, two linear regressions are
fitted for log APX and log South Norway prices using the Newey-West estimator. This is an OLS
estimator using a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix9,
which means that the estimated standard errors are robust to the effects of heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation of lag up to 1,000 periods. In all other respects, it produces the same results
as OLS. All relevant explanatory variables are included in each regression to start with10, and any
variables that are not significant at the 90% confidence level are eliminated from the regression
equations. The R2 values for both regressions are 0.60. Full results are reported in Appendix D.
3.3 Autocorrelation
Although the presence of autocorrelation in the regression residuals means that Gauss-Markov
conditions are not satisfied, autocorrelation on its own does not make OLS estimates biased
or inconsistent as long as lagged values of the dependent variable are not present on the right
hand side of the regression equation. It merely makes OLS estimates inefficient, distorting their
associated t-statistics11. However, significant autocorrelation in the residuals indicates that the
model is incorrectly specified. With all significant explanatory variables included12, the R2 val-
9See Newey, W. K. and West, K. D., "A simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation
Consistent Covariance Matrix," Econometrica, Vol. 55 (1987), pp. 703-708
10The full list of explanatory variables is given in Appendix B
11See Greene, W.H. Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. Chapter 12
12Significance tests are based on a 90% confidence level.
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ues for both regressions are 0.60, which means that a significant proportion of the variation in
log electricity prices is unexplained. In combination with the presence of autocorrelation in the
residuals, this could mean that the explanatory variables omitted from the regression are auto-
correlated. These omitted variables may introduce substantial bias in the estimates of the OLS
coefficients exogenous variables included in the regression13.
The test of the Gauss-Markov assumption of zero autocorrelation in the regression residuals
is carried out by implementing the LM test for the joint significance of N lags of the residuals
in the regression of the least squares residuals on all independent explanatory variables and
lagged least squares residuals. The result is a strong rejection of the null hypothesis of zero
autocorrelation for N of anywhere between 1 and 100 for both regressions. Figures 4 and 5 below
confirm that strong autocorrelation is present in the residuals from both regressions.
Figure 4: Autocorrelation function for log APX price OLS regression residuals
13See Greene, W.H. Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. pp148-149
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Figure 5: Autocorrelation function for log South Norway price OLS regression residuals
The extent of autocorrelation in regression residuals is clearly much greater in the case of South
Norway. This is due to the fact that much of the electricity generation in Norway is reservoir
based. A reservoir generator must make an optimal inter-temporal choice on when to produce
energy as generation in one time period is a substitute for generation in another time period.
This would mean dynamic optimisation of output decisions on an hourly basis. If there is a
shock to the electricity price in any given hour, even if the shock is transient, it will induce gener-
ators to either reduce or increase reservoir levels compared to their expected levels. This change
would in turn affect the willingness of generators to supply electricity in subsequent periods.
The same would not be the case for a transient shock in a thermal system because there are no
electricity reserves to draw on in a thermal system. However, a thermal system can be slow to
respond to shocks because even if spare generation capacity is available, it may take some time
to get a plant up and running. This could generate persistence in price shocks on an hourly
basis.
Figure 4 also reveals that cyclical autocorrelation patterns with daily and weekly periodicity are
present together with hourly autocorrelation in the residuals from the regression of log APX
prices. This suggests that unexplained shocks to the electricity price level tend to be persistent
on an hourly, daily and a weekly basis in a thermal system, with hourly persistence being the
strongest factor. One example of a shock that is likely to display both hourly and daily persis-
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tence is a plant outage lasting several weeks. If the plant in question only comes into operation
during peak hours, the shock to the price due to its outage is likely to persist only during the
remaining peak hours of that day and to have a recurring effect during peak hours of subse-
quent days until it is brought back into operation. The ability of a thermal system to dampen
such shocks may be limited because most plants can be expected to be operating at full capacity
during peak hours.
The weekly pattern of autocorrelation in the residuals of log APX prices is more difficult to ex-
plain. It is likely to be due to contracting and electricity derivatives trading. Assume, for ex-
ample, that a significant number of contracts are created, specifying delivery of electricity on a
certain day of the week for a number of months. Assume further that all parties’ positions are
not perfectly hedged, meaning either that some of the parties with a long position do not require
all the electricity they are contracted to buy or that some of the parties with a short position do
not have all the electricity required to meet the terms of their contract. Any shock that affects a
period under the contract is likely to display persistence with weekly periodicity.
Strong autocorrelation in the dependent variable could also indicate the presence of a unit root,
meaning that the time series is not stationary, or in other words, not mean reverting. This could
mean that the probability distribution of the dependent variable is not the same for all observa-
tions but changes over time. The consequence for regression results would be that standard er-
rors of estimated coefficients would be distorted and inferences based on standard significance
tests would become invalid14. A significant relationship between two or more variables could
simply mean that they are following the same trend without any further underlying relationship
between them, a phenomenon more commonly known as spurious correlation.
We test for the presence of a unit root using the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock efficient test. This is
similar to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test but is adjusted for heteroskedastic errors. The null
hypothesis of a unit root at lag one is rejected at the 99% confidence level for both log price
series. However, keeping in mind the cyclical pattern of autocorrelation in hourly electricity
price series, we also test for a unit root at longer lags. The maximum order of the lag for the
purposes of this test is 49, chosen by using the Ng-Perron sequential t-test15. For log APX prices,
the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 99% confidence level for all lag lengths up
to 49. For log South Norway prices, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 95%
confidence level for all lag lengths except 19-23 and 46-47, for which it is rejected at the 90%
confidence level, in some cases only marginally. This result suggests that log APX prices are
stationary, but the stationarity of log South Norway prices cannot be completely ensured. This
is the result we would expect after observing the frequency distributions of the two log price
14See Greene, W.H. Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. Ch. 20, pp632-635
15Knittel & Roberts (2005), who also use an hourly time series of electricity prices, only test for a unit root up to
an order of 4
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series in Figures 10 and 11 in Appendix A. The distribution of log APX prices looks a lot like a
normal distribution with the same mean and variance parameters, whereas the distribution of
log South Norway prices is characterised by significant skewedness and kurtosis.
3.4 ARMA
Econometric literature generally recommends specifying a model with autoregressive distur-
bances if the residuals from an OLS model are found to be serially correlated16. Therefore, in
order to correct for this specification error, the estimation technique is refined to incorporate
autocorrelation in the disturbances. This is formulated as follows
yt =
K∑
i=1
xt iβi +µt
µt =
P∑
p=1
φpµt−p +
Q∑
q=1
θqεt−q +εt .
The first equation is a structural equation and the second equation specifies the ARMA structure
of the disturbances. The explanatory variables in the structural equation are as in the original
linear regression with Newey-West standard errors. This model is estimated using conditional
maximum likelihood, which, given the large number of observations, should yield the same
results as unconditional maximum likelihood. The results may be seen in Appendix E.
Figures 12 and 13 in Appendix C plot the autocorrelation functions of residuals from the ARMA
models of log APX and log South Norway prices. They demonstrate that, in both cases, model
misspecification has been corrected and model residuals resemble white noise.
3.5 Endogeneity
The focus of this paper is on the effect of trading over the NorNed interconnector on prices in
the two connected regions. However, putting flows over NorNed directly into a regression where
the log electricity price is the dependent variable may result in inconsistent estimates. This is
because the direction of electricity flows is determined by the price difference between the two
16See, for example, Godfrey (1987)
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connected regions, making it likely that flows over NorNed are endogenous to the electricity
price17.
One simple test for endogeneity is the augmented Durbin-Wu-Hausman test18. This test is per-
formed in three stages. Firstly, the potentially endogenous variable that represents flows over
NorNed is regressed on all exogenous variables. Secondly, the residuals from that regression are
saved as a new variable. Thirdly, the original regression with log APX or log South Norway prices
as the dependent variable is carried out with the new variable added to the list of explanatory
variables in that regression. If the coefficient of that new variable is significant, this is taken as
an indication that simultaneity bias may be present.
The test is carried out with respect to both log South Norway and log APX prices. The null
hypothesis that flows over NorNed are exogenous to log prices cannot be rejected at the 90%
confidence level in either case19. This result suggests that simultaneity bias is unlikely to be
a problem. The reason that flows over NorNed are not significantly endogenous to prices is
because those flows are determined by the sign of the difference in prices between the two con-
nected regions and not the magnitude of that difference. Electricity typically flows from the low
price region to the high price region up to the full capacity of the interconnector. This means
that most unexplained shocks to the electricity price either in South Norway or the Netherlands
have no effect on flows over NorNed.
Note also that, because there is no single market mechanism that simultaneously determines
day-ahead electricity prices and power flows over the interconnector, a process otherwise known
as market coupling, electricity does not always flow from the region with lower day-ahead prices
to the region with higher day-ahead prices. Between 6 May 2008, when NorNed became fully op-
erational, and 12 March 2009, which is the last date on our data set, electricity actually flowed
from the higher price market to the lower price market 12.7% of the time. This market imper-
fection is another reason why the case for electricity prices and flows over NorNed being simul-
taneously determined is weak.
17Other ways of entering flows over NorNed into the regression were attempted, such as entering one dummy
variable for periods when electricity is being exported from Norway and another for when electricity is being im-
ported into Norway. The estimated coefficients gave broadly the same results as the specification opted for here,
except that the variable corresponding to imports into Norway was mostly insignificant.
18Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. G., Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, New York: Oxford University
Press (1993)
19The test of significance is carried out on the basis of Newey-West standard errors, ensuring that the results of
the test are not affected by heteroskedasticity or serial correlation in the residuals
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4 Results: price effect of NorNed
4.1 ARMA estimates
The primary aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of electricity flows over NorNed on elec-
tricity prices in the Netherlands and South Norway. Separate regression models are estimated
for each of the two markets. In order to test the robustness of the results, each model is esti-
mated for two different data samples. They are firstly estimated for the entire sample period,
which includes observations from before and after May 2008 when NorNed came online. Sec-
ondly, they are estimated for the sub-sample of observations beginning on 6 May 2008 when
NorNed came online. Assuming that NorNed is used up to its full capacity, the estimated aver-
age effect of flows from Norway to the Netherlands is to reduce the APX electricity price by 2.6%
and to increase the South Norway nodal price by 4.2%20.
The ARMA regression estimates of the average effect of flows over NorNed on electricity prices
in the Netherlands and South Norway are both significant at the 90% confidence level and con-
sistent with respect to the sample used21. Re-estimating both regressions for the sub-sample of
observations since NorNed came online produces very similar estimates of the price effect of
NorNed.
4.2 Interpretation
These results suggest that, since NorNed was activated, the average sensitivity of APX prices
to electricity flows across the interconnector has been low, and indeed lower than for South
Norway prices. This result is surprising in two respects. Firstly, NorNed could be expected to
have a significant effect on prices in the Netherlands given that the capacity of NorNed is equal
to approximately 5% of average total available generation capacity in the Netherlands and that
the short-run price elasticity of demand for electricity tends to be very low. If the supply of
electricity is independent of flows over NorNed, the short-run price elasticity of demand implied
20The regression coefficient of norned gives the estimated effect of 100MW of exports from Norway to the
Netherlands on the log APX price. Translating from logarithms to actual prices, the absolute estimated effect of
exports over NorNed on prices will differ depending on the starting price, but the estimated percentage change will
always be the same. A coefficient -0.01 implies that exports from Norway to the Netherlands up to the full capacity
of NorNed can be expected to reduce the APX price by 6.8%.
21In the EGARCH model with multiplicative heteroskedasticity, corresponding estimates of the price effect of
NorNed on both sets of prices are significant at the 99% significance level.
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by the estimated price effect of NorNed is around -222. This is an order of magnitude higher
than the short-run price elasticity of demand for electricity estimated in most empirical studies,
which tends to be around -0.323. Another way to look at it is that, if the average short-run price
elasticity of demand for electricity in the Dutch market is -0.3, the implied average short-run
price elasticity of supply in the Dutch electricity market is 2.224, which is reasonably high and
suggests a relatively flat short run electricity supply curve.
Secondly, the effect of NorNed on the APX price could be expected to be greater than its effect
on the South Norway price given that the two markets are of comparable size25. The Norwegian
generation base is characterised by a large share of reservoirs in overall generation capacity.
When electricity is imported or exported by a reservoir system, the impact of those flows on the
system price is unlikely to be restricted to that hour because electricity is storable in a reservoir
system. Generators are willing to supply electricity up to the point where their marginal cost is
equal to their marginal revenue. The largest component of marginal cost for a reservoir genera-
tor is the shadow price of production, i.e. the ability to sell that electricity in another time period.
Unless reservoirs are overflowing, this would be positive for any given period because produc-
tion in the current period reduces the generator’s ability to take advantage of higher prices in
another period. In other words, the option value of unused reservoir capacity is generally posi-
tive. Hence imports into a reservoir system in a given time period are unlikely to cause a signifi-
cant drop in the market price in that period because reservoir generators would be unwilling to
supply electricity at a significantly lower price. The same would not be the case for the Dutch
electricity market, which is dominated by thermal generation, because production in one hour
is not a substitute for production in another hour for a thermal generator.
One possible explanation, which is tested in Section 4.4, is that the low price response of the
Dutch electricity market is determined by the behaviour of generators. This section tests whether
the system price is more responsive to flows over NorNed when the system is operating near full
capacity. Another explanation is that the Dutch electricity market is closely integrated with its
neighbouring markets and NorNed capacity is small relative to the total available generation
capacity in those markets. This is explored in Section 4.3.
It is also worth remembering that market coupling has not been implemented between the
22Price elasticity ²k (p) of Marshallian demand xk (p,m) for good k is given by ²k (p) = ∂xk (p,m)∂pk
pk
xk (p,m)
, where m
denotes income
23See [3], [5], [8], and [26] among numerous other studies
24The total change in equilibrium quantity Q of good k is given by dQk = dpk
(
∂xk (p,m)
∂pk
pk
xk (p,m)
+ ∂yk (p)∂pk
pk
yk (p)
)
,
where the second term inside the brackets is the price elasticity of supply for good k
25Both markets also have links with neighbouring markets, which, depending on transmission constraints at any
given time, can expand the definition of a domestic market. South Norway is directly connected with the rest of
Norway, as well as Sweden and Denmark.The Netherlands is directly connected with Belgium and Germany.
17
Netherlands and Norway. As stated earlier, one result of the current market arrangements is
that electricity does not always flow from the region with lower day-ahead prices to the region
with higher day-ahead prices. It would be interesting to know what difference market coupling
between Norway and the Netherlands would make to the effect of flows over NorNed on prices
in the two markets. It is possible that the apparent lack of sensitivity of the APX price to flows
over NorNed is due to imperfections in the market mechanism that is currently in place. Unfor-
tunately, this counter-factual cannot be checked using existing data.
4.3 Market integration
All national electricity markets in Europe are connected to some extent, either directly or in-
directly through other countries. Unless those links are permanently constrained, individual
markets may effectively be merged with other neighbouring markets some of the time, with a
single market price for electricity prevailing in both. Since imports into a large market can be
expected to have less of an impact on the market price than exports into a similar but smaller
market, the coupling of two or more markets may reduce the price impact of imports into any
one of them. The low average sensitivity of electricity prices in the Netherlands to flows over
NorNed may therefore be due to the fact that the Dutch electricity market is coupled with large
neighbouring markets much of the time. The Dutch electricity market is connected to the Bel-
gian and German markets, and also to the French market indirectly via the Belgian market. The
interaction with French and German markets is of particular interest in this respect because
they are large relative to the Dutch market.
By inserting an appropriate dummy variable into the regression equation, it should be possi-
ble to test this theory. This variable should be correlated with binding transmission constraints
that separate the Dutch market from neighbouring markets. This exercise is much more easily
carried out with respect to the French market because market coupling has been implemented
between the French, Dutch and Belgian markets. This means that a single system price is cal-
culated for all three markets, assuming that there are no transmission constraints, and if those
constraints turn out to be binding for that price, those are priced explicitly so as to balance
supply and demand in each zone. When markets are effectively merged, the electricity price in
those markets will be the same. This is not the case for German and Dutch markets because the
auctions for transmission capacity and electricity in the two countries are held separately and at
different times, making it more difficult to tell when the transmission constraints between the
two markets are binding.
The regression for the log APX price is run using the ARMA model as before. The results are
checked for consistency by also running the regression using a sub-sample of observations for
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the period after NorNed was activated. The only difference is that one extra variable is added to
this regression. The additional variable takes the following values
coupt =
{
nornedt i f apxt 6= powernextt
0 otherwi se
.
This means that coup equals the quantity of exports from Norway to the Netherlands in any
period where the transmission constraints between the French and Dutch markets are binding
(i.e. the APX price is different from the Powernext (French) price) and a value of 0 otherwise26.
The regression then takes the following general form.
yt =α+β1nornedt +β2coupt +
N∑
i=3
xi tβi +²t ,
where xi are other explanatory variables. When electricity prices in the French and Dutch day
ahead markets are different, the regression equation effectively becomes
yt =α+ (β1+β2)nornedt +
N∑
i=3
xi tβi +²t ,
and when the two markets are effectively merged, it becomes
yt =α+β1nornedt +
N∑
i=3
xi tβi +²t .
Thus if norned and coup are both significant, the effect of market coupling on the sensitivity
of electricity prices to flows over NorNed is given by the ratio of β1 to β1+β2. If the value of that
ratio in absolute terms is not significantly different from 1, this indicates that coupling between
the French and the Dutch day ahead electricity prices makes no significant difference to the
sensitivity of the APX price to flows over NorNed.
When the modified ARMA regression is run, coup turns out not to be significant at the 90%
confidence level. Its coefficient is also small relative to the coefficient of norned , such that that
the ratio β1/(β1+β2) is 1.04. This result is stable to running the regression for the sub-sample
of observations beginning with NorNed coming online. The ratio β1/(β1+β2) in this case is 1.01
and coup is also not significant at the 90% confidence level.
Putting aside for a moment the result that coup is not significant at any reasonable confidence
level, a ratio β1/(β1+β2) of 1.04 would indicate that, when the French and Dutch markets are
effectively merged, the sensitivity of the APX price to flows over NorNed is actually slightly higher
than when the prices prevailing in those markets are different. All this points to the conclusion
that the effect of electricity flows over NorNed on the APX price is unlikely to depend on whether
the connections between French and Dutch electricity markets are constrained.
26Exports in the opposite direction are represented by negative numbers as before
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4.4 Price spikes
The ability of an interconnector to dampen significant price spikes determines its contribution
to price stabilisation and ultimately to system stability. For this contribution to be significant, it
would have to be the case that the effect of trading over NorNed in terms of the price movement
it produces is considerably greater during a price spike than during a period of relative price
stability. Otherwise, given the sensitivity of the APX price to flows over NorNed estimated in
Section 4.1, NorNed is unlikely to make a significant contribution to electricity price stability in
the Netherlands.
The reaction of a thermal system to imports over an interconnector may depend on how tight
market conditions are in any given period. If most generators are not operating near full capac-
ity, the merit order curve is likely to be flat locally because generators would be able to increase
their output without bringing less efficient generation units into play. Unless the market price
is significantly above marginal cost, imports are unlikely to push prices down under these con-
ditions because domestic thermal generators would be unwilling to supply electricity at below
marginal cost. Thus imports would simply crowd out domestic generation, leaving the market
price virtually unchanged.
For similar reasons, exports out of this market would be unlikely to push domestic prices up
under these conditions. Domestic generators would simply increase production without in-
creasing their marginal cost. If, on the other hand, most generators are operating at or near full
capacity, their marginal cost curve is likely to be very steep or even vertical locally. If marginal
cost pricing prevails, imports into this market are likely to push the market price down signif-
icantly because some generators will have been supplying electricity at marginal cost which is
very high and imports would push those generators out of the market by lowering the system
marginal cost.
This theory can be tested by interacting an appropriately chosen dummy variable, which would
be correlated with tight market conditions, with flows over NorNed and adding the resulting
variable into the model. The methodology would be as in Section 4.3. The dummy variable
must be exogenous to the regression residuals. If the dummy variable is correlated with the
regression residuals, which would be the case if it was chosen on the basis of the price level
in a given period, results are likely to be spurious. A simple way to get around this problem is
to use a dummy variable which is exogenous to the regression residuals but is still positively
correlated with tight market conditions and above-average prices. The variable chosen here
is equal to flows over NorNed during peak hours, defined as all week-day hours excluding the
period between 9pm and 7am, and equal to 0 otherwise27.
27The Dutch, Belgian and French markets are marginally less likely to be coupled during peak hours than during
off-peak hours as defined here, though the difference is very small.
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The regression for the log APX price is run as before using the ARMA model. The only difference
here is that one extra explanatory variable is added to the regression equation. This variable
takes the following values
peakt =
{
nornedt i f
∑21
δ=8 Hδt 6= 0
0 otherwi se
,
where Hδt is an hourly dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when t corresponds to hour δ
and a value of 0 otherwise (e.g. H23t takes a value of 1 if t corresponds to the penultimate hour
of a day and a value of 0 otherwise). This means that peakt is equal to norned in any period
defined as a peak hour, and equal to 0 otherwise. The regression then takes the following general
form
yt =α+β1nornedt +β2peakt +
N∑
i=3
xi tβi +²t ,
where xi are other explanatory variables. For peak hours, the regression equation effectively
becomes
yt =α+ (β1+β2)nornedt +
N∑
i=3
xi tβi +²t ,
and for off-peak hours, it becomes
yt =α+β1nornedt +
N∑
i=3
xi tβi +²t .
When the modified ARMA model is run, the coefficient of peak is not significant at the 90%
confidence level. The relevant coefficients of norned and peak are such that that the ratio
β1/(β1+β2) is 0.79. A qualitatively similar result is obtained after running the regression for the
sub-sample of observations beginning with NorNed coming online. The ratio β1/(β1+β2) in
this case is 0.90 and peak is also not significant at the 90% confidence level28. When the ARMA
model is run excluding the norned variable and including the peak variable, the coefficient of
peak is likewise not significant at the 90% confidence level.
Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that the effect of flows over NorNed on the APX price
may be greater for peak hours than for off-peak hours. Setting aside for the moment the lack
of a statistically significant result, given the low estimated average sensitivity of the APX price
to electricity flows across the interconnector, the corresponding effect in peak hours is still rela-
tively small. If β1/(β1+β2) is 0.79, this implies that the effect of trading over NorNed on the APX
price is only 27% greater in peak hours than off-peak hours. This result would still imply that the
28Note that significance tests may be affected by the presence of heteroskedasticity. See Section 5.2 for more
details
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effectiveness of NorNed in terms of smoothing out electricity price spikes in the Netherlands is
fairly limited.
This result could also have implications for the behaviour of generators in the Dutch market. In
the standard Cournot model with N players29, linear demand and constant marginal cost, total
industry output is given by
N∑
i=1
qi = N (a− c)
N +1 .
Any imports or exports over NorNed would be treated as a competitive fringe, expressed as a
change in parameter a. It immediately follows from this formula that industry output is more
responsive to flows over NorNed when N is large. Therefore the result that the APX price is
slightly more sensitive to flows over NorNed in peak than off-peak hours could imply two things.
Firstly, it could imply that generators’ behaviour is slightly less competitive during peak hours
than during off-peak hours. Secondly, it could imply that the merit order curve is upward sloping
for peak hours.
Neither of these two implications would be surprising. One would expect both of them to hold.
It is surprising that their cumulative effect appears to be fairly modest in quantitative terms
and is not statistically significant. A more detailed study of the effect of NorNed on competitive
behaviour of incumbent generators in the Netherlands is beyond the scope of this paper and is
left for future study.
5 Estimating the effect of NorNed on residual volatility
5.1 Methodology
The estimation technique set out in Section 3 can help to measure the effect of flows over
NorNed on the expected APX and South Norway prices. However, in order to test the hypothesis
that NorNed has changed the volatility of prices in the Netherlands and South Norway since it
has come into operation, it is also necessary to estimate the effect of NorNed on residual price
volatility. The variance of residuals from the ARMA model of log APX prices makes up around
29The Cournot model is useful in this context because it behaves like a monopoly when N = 1 and like perfect
competition as N →∞
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60% of total variance of log APX prices and 62% of total variance of APX prices30. This suggests
that residual volatility contains a slightly greater share of price spikes compared to its share of
overall volatility.
This section sets out the framework for estimating the effect of NorNed on residual variance of
electricity prices in the two connected regions. It supplements Sections 3 and 4 by calculating
the dampening effect of NorNed on volatility that is not explained by the model. The first step
is to test the assumption of homoskedastic errors in the ARMA models of log APX and South
Norway prices, which is found to be violated in both cases. More detailed examination reveals
that heteroskedasticity partly results from autocorrelation in the variance of residuals.
To model autocorrelation in the variance of regression residuals, an EGARCH model with mul-
tiplicative heteroskedasticity and an autoregressive error structure is proposed31. This involves
modelling volatility of regression residuals with exogenous explanatory variables whilst also ac-
counting for persistence in volatility. The coefficient of the variable in the volatility equation
that indicates the availability of NorNed is used as an estimate of the effect of NorNed on resid-
ual volatility of electricity prices. In justifying the choice of methodology, this section reviews
more traditional models of conditional heteroskedasticity as well as EGARCH and EARCH. A
summary of their main properties for the purposes of this paper is given below.
30The residual variance as a proportion of total variance of log APX prices is calculate directly from the structural
model. For APX prices, this proportion is calculated by generating predicted log APX prices from the structural
model, converting them to predicted APX prices by taking the natural exponent and then calculating residuals as
the difference between actual and predicted APX prices. The proportion of residual variation in total variation of
APX prices is then calculated from this result directly.
31Volatility of log APX prices is modeled as an EARCH process given the lack of clear cyclicality in the autocorre-
lation function for square errors.
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The advantage of being able to specify autoregressive (AR) as well as moving average (MA) terms
in the volatility equation is that it allows the modelling of repeated patterns of autocorrelation
in square returns. This is found to be relevant in the case of South Norway prices but not APX
prices. Asymmetric shocks represent added model flexibility by which positive and negative
shocks can persist in different ways. This is found to be relevant in the case of both APX and
South Norway prices32. Finally, EARCH and EGARCH models, by specifying volatility in loga-
rithmic form, avoid the possibility of volatility being negative for some periods depending on
estimated model parameters. Since this is a real possibility for ARCH and GARCH models, this
implies restrictions on parameters in those models that may be difficult to work out and imple-
ment.
5.2 Heteroskedasticity
The first step is to check if the Gauss-Markov condition of homoskedastic errors is satisfied.
The most general test for heteroskedasticity is the White test. For the purposes of this test, no
assumptions need to be made about the specific nature of the heteroskedasticity. The null hy-
pothesis is that regression residuals are homoskedastic and the test statistic is asymptotically
distributed as chi-squared. The test is carried out on the residuals from both ARMA regressions.
The null hypothesis of homoskedastic errors is rejected for both with P values of 0 in each case.
32See Appendix F for details.
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For the log South Norway price ARMA regression, the test statistic is 10,694 with 361 degrees of
freedom, and for the log APX price ARMA regression, the test statistic is 9,626 with 748 degrees
of freedom. This result suggests that heteroskedasticity in the residuals from both regressions is
likely to be significant.
Heteroskedasticity does not cause coefficient estimates from an ARMA model to be biased.
However, it does cause the estimates of the variance of those coefficients to be biased, mean-
ing that those coefficient estimates are not efficient and their associated t-statistics are likely to
be distorted. This means that selecting which variables to keep in a regression and which to
eliminate on the basis of their associated t-statistics may lead to the elimination of some vari-
ables that are in fact significant and to retaining some that are insignificant. In order to obtain
efficient estimates of the coefficients of all relevant explanatory variables, an adjustment to the
estimation technique is required. This is discussed further in subsequent sections.
5.3 Persistence in volatility
All we know so far from carrying out the White test is Section 5.2 is that price volatility has not
been constant in either of the connected markets throughout the span of our data set. The
disadvantage of the White test for heteroskedastic errors is that it does not specify the exact
form of heteroskedasticity found in the residuals. However, some information may be obtained
by observation from a plot of regression residuals against time. The plots of residuals against
time for the two ARMA regressions are as follows.
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Figure 6: Residuals from ARMA regression of log APX price
Figure 7: Residuals from ARMA regression of log South Norway price
26
A quick glance reveals that, particularly for the residuals from the ARMA model of log South Nor-
way prices, periods of high volatility tend to be bunched together, as are periods of relative calm.
This indicates that volatility may contain a strong element of persistence. In that case, squared
errors from the ARMA model could be expected to display a significant degree of autocorre-
lation. It is possible to check for persistence in squared errors by examining their associated
autocorrelation function. These are plotted below for both ARMA models.
Figure 8: Autocorrelations of squared errors from log APX price ARMA model
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Figure 9: Autocorrelations of squared errors from log South Norway price ARMA model
It is possible to tell by observation that squared errors display a significant degree of persistence
in the ARMA model of log South Norway prices, with hourly and daily patterns of autocorre-
lation. For log APX prices, there appear to be clusters of autocorrelation in square errors cor-
responding to hourly, daily and weekly persistence in volatility. A more formal test for serial
correlation in squared errors is the LM test proposed in Engle (1982). The test involves regress-
ing squared residuals on a constant and q lagged values. The null hypothesis is that there is no
autocorrelation in squared errors. The alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the estimated
coefficients of the lagged squared error terms is significant. For a sample of T residuals, the test
statistic TR2 follows chi-squared distribution with q degrees of freedom. Applying the test to the
residuals from both ARMA models results in a strong rejection of the null hypothesis for both.
This confirms what could be gathered from observing the plots of autocorrelations of squared
errors.
Persistence in the volatility of electricity prices can occur for different reasons. In a reservoir sys-
tem, when reservoir levels are low, the shadow price of generation in the current period is high
because it removes the option to produce in another time period. Thus periods of volatility are
likely to coincide with low reservoir levels when generators are less willing to arbitrage volatility
in the electricity price. Since reservoirs cannot be replenished quickly, volatility is likely to be
characterised by persistence. In a thermal system, a supply or a demand shock can be expected
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to have a greater effect on the price level when market conditions are tight. Since periods when
market conditions are tight tend to be bunched together during peak hours and separated by
periods of 24 hours or weekly intervals, persistence in volatility is likely to be characterised by
the same pattern.
5.4 ARCH
A commonly observed property of many economic time series and especially high frequency
financial time series is that the volatility of the time series is not constant through time. Rather,
periods of low volatility and periods of high volatility tend to be grouped together. Autore-
gressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models estimate time-dependent volatility as
a function of observed prior volatility. The volatility model may also include regressors that
account for a structural component of volatility. ARCH models were first introduced by Engle
(1982). They model the variance of regression residuals as a linear function of past residuals. An
ARCH(m) model can be written as
yt =
K∑
i=1
xt iβi +εt
σ2t = γ0+γ1ε2t−1+ ...+γmε2t−m
where
εt ∼N (0,σ2t )
ε2t are the squared residuals for period t and γ j are the ARCH parameters. The model specifies
the conditional mean and the conditional variance, where variance is a function of the magni-
tude of past unanticipated shocks ε2t . This model was generalized in Bollerslev (1986) to include
lagged values of the conditional variance. The GARCH(m,l) model can be written as
yt =
K∑
i=1
xt iβi +εt
σ2t = γ0+γ1ε2t−1+ ...+γmε2t−m +δ1σ2t−1+ ...+δlσ2t−l
where γ j are the ARCH parameters and δ j are the GARCH parameters. The GARCH model of
conditional variance can be considered an ARMA process in the squared residuals. Both ARCH
and GARCH models are calculated from the underlying data using conditional maximum likeli-
hood, which means that the likelihood is calculated based on an estimated set of starting values
for the squared residuals ε2t and variances σ
2
t .
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The GARCH model revolutionised the modelling of returns on financial instruments, which had
previously assumed that those returns were normally distributed, and has since then found ap-
plications in other fields. It has been applied to the modelling of electricity prices in a number
of papers, some of which are mentioned below. It’s major advantage is that it enables the persis-
tence in volatility, which we observe in the case of hourly log APX and log South Norway prices,
to be modeled explicitly.
However, the GARCH model has a number of limitations which create difficulties with applying
it to the modelling of volatility in electricity prices. These are described in Nelson (1991). The
first such limitation is that both positive and negative shocks are assumed to affect the condi-
tional variance of the residuals in exactly the same way. Knittel and Roberts (2005) find that
the effect of shocks to hourly electricity prices on future volatility depends on the sign of those
shocks as well as their magnitude for the price series that the examine. This paper also finds this
to be the case for log South Norway and log APX prices.
Another limitation of the GARCH model lies in the non-negativity constraints on the GARCH
terms, which are designed to ensure that σ2 remains positive with probability 1. These con-
straints imply that increasing shocks will always increase σ2 in future periods. This rules out
oscillatory behaviour in the σ2t process and creates problems for applied researchers, who of-
ten find that the parameters of their model that provide the best fit to their data actually violate
those constraints. This has certainly been the case for modelling electricity prices, with Duffie
et al. (1998) amongst others finding that the GARCH terms estimated for daily electricity prices
violate the non-negativity constraints.
A third drawback of GARCH models is that the estimated process for conditional volatility is
often non-stationary and indeed explosive. This is because in GARCH models, the conditional
moments of GARCH may be explosive even when the underlying process is strictly stationary.
Escribano et al. (2002) and Goto and Karolyi (2003) find this to be the case with GARCH models
fitted to average daily electricity prices. They deal with this problem by introducing jump pro-
cesses into the equation governing conditional volatility. We find that, in the case of log South
Norway and APX prices, using a variation on the GARCH model can help to overcome this prob-
lem.
5.5 EGARCH
The Exponential Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (EGARCH) model, first
proposed in Nelson (1991), addresses all three of the concerns about the GARCH model set out
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above. Conditional variance is modeled in logarithmic form as
ln(σ2t )=
K∑
k=1
βkzt−k +
M∑
m=1
γm | zt−m −
p
2/pi | +
J∑
j=1
δ j ln(σ
2
t− j )
zt ∼N (0,σ2t ).
Thus the logarithm of the conditional variance can be negative without the underlying con-
ditional variance being negative. This means that the non-negativity restrictions on the co-
efficients in the above equation are not required. The model allows for positive and negative
shocks to have differing effects on conditional variance, which are captured by the first term on
the RHS of the above equation. The symmetric effect of shocks is captured by the second term.
Finally, because now conditional variance is determined by a linear process, its stationarity can
be checked in the same way as for a normal ARMA process. This is done by checking whether
any of the roots of the characteristic polynomial lie outside of the unit circle33.
5.6 Multiplicative heteroskedasticity
ARCH family models, including EGARCH, assume a form of path-dependence in volatility that
does not rely on a particular explanation for volatility levels. Whilst they have been used suc-
cessfully to model electricity prices, it is likely that modelling conditional volatility using ex-
ogenous determinants in addition to ARCH effects would yield more efficient estimates than a
plain ARCH family model. Also, since the main aim of this paper is to test the effect of NorNed
on the level and volatility of prices in the two connected markets, it is essential for us to be able
to add an explanatory variable associated with NorNed into the equation governing conditional
volatility.
The last refinement to the methodology adopted in this paper is to model the equation govern-
ing the conditional variance of log electricity prices as an Exponential Generalised Autoregres-
sive Conditional Heteroskedastic process with additive exponential terms that model volatility
using exogenous explanatory variables. It therefore extends the EGARCH modelling approach
adopted by Knittel and Roberts (2005) by adding explanatory terms to the mean and conditional
variance equations. Mean log electricity prices are modeled with an extensive set of exogenous
explanatory variables and residuals that follow an ARMA process as before.
The general specification of the EGARCH models of log South Norway and log APX prices is as
follows.
yt =
K∑
i=1
xt iβi +µt
33It can be easily checked that both EGARCH processes estimated in this paper are stationary
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µt =
P∑
p=1
φpµt−p +
Q∑
q=1
θqεt−q +εt
ln(σ2t )=α0+
Q∑
q=1
αqwqt +
K∑
k=1
βkzt−k +
M∑
m=1
γm | zt−m −
p
2/pi | +
J∑
j=1
δ j ln(σ
2
t− j )
zt ∼N (0,σ2t ),
where wqt are exogenous explanatory variables and αq are their corresponding coefficients.
Because volatility is specified in logarithmic form, taking the exponent of both sides of the above
equation results in the following specification of actual volatility of log prices.
σ2t = eα0+
∑Q
q=1αqwqt+
∑4
k=1βk zt−k+
∑4
m=1γm |zt−m−
p
2/pi|+∑Jj=1δ j ln(σ2t− j ).
Hence each explanatory variable has a multiplicative effect on variance.
The explanatory variables added into the mean equation as well as the specification of the resid-
uals are as in the ARMA models presented in Section 3.4. The specification of EGARCH terms in
the conditional volatility equation is derived from the corresponding autocorrelation function
of squared residuals. This may be seen in Section 5.3. Any such terms that are not significant at
the 90% confidence level are removed from the equation.
The EGARCH model with multiplicative heteroskedasticity makes it possible to check directly
whether NorNed has made a difference to residual volatility, i.e. price shocks that cannot be
explained by any exogenous explanatory variables. The effect of NorNed is incorporated in the
volatility equation through a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when NorNed is opera-
tional and a value of 0 otherwise. So that the estimate of the volatility effect of NorNed is not
completely spurious and does not capture any differences that are attributable to other fac-
tors, week-day, monthly and time-of-day dummies are also added into the volatility equation
together with a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 after NorNed came online. Different in-
dicators of reservoir levels are also added into the volatility equation in the log South Norway
price model.
The full estimation results for both models may be seen in Appendix F.
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6 Results: residual volatility effect of NorNed
6.1 EGARCH estimates
Applying the definition of multiplicative heteroskedasticity from Section 5.6 to EGARCH regres-
sion results34, NorNed is estimated to lower the residual variance of log APX prices by 17%.
This estimate is obtained after accounting for any time of day, week-day or seasonal effects and
also any unknown factors that would have affected residual volatility for the entire period after
NorNed came online. To translate this into the estimated effect of NorNed on APX prices, some
preliminaries are required. Note that the mean of a log-normally distributed variable is given by
E(X )= eµ+σ2/2
and its variance is given by
Var (X )=
(
eσ
2 −1
)
e2µ+σ
2
,
where µ and σ2 are the mean and variance of that variable’s natural logarithm. Given estimates
ofµ andσ2, that is the mean and variance of log APX prices estimated from the subset of the data
sample for the period since NorNed came online35 and applying the above formulas, a 17% drop
in the residual variance of the log APX price translates into a 20% drop in the residual variance
of the APX price36. Since σ2 also enters the expression for the mean APX price, a reduction in
the variance of the log APX price will also affect the mean of the APX price. However, given the
values ofµ andσ2 estimated from the data sample and the fact that that residual variance makes
up around 60% of total variance of log APX prices, this effect is found to be very small.
In the case of the log South Norway price, the estimated coefficient of the variable that repre-
sents the operating status of NorNed in the volatility equation is tiny and statistically insignif-
icant at any reasonable level of confidence. It is therefore concluded that NorNed has had no
effect on the residual variance of the log South Norway price.
6.2 Interpretation
In theory, a reservoir system should act as a battery when connected to a thermal system, im-
porting electricity when the thermal system price is low and exporting when it is high. This
34See Appendix F. The estimated coefficient of the variable that represents the operating status of NorNed in the
volatility equation is -0.1847.
35µ is estimated at 4.101 and σ2 is estimated at 0.256
36In order to obtain this result, note that residual variance makes up around 60% of total variance of log APX
prices
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should dampen both positive and negative price shocks in the thermal system with one signifi-
cant qualification. This would only occur if there is no permanent difference in prices between
the two systems such that electricity only ever flows in one direction.
The pattern of electricity flows over NorNed has been fairly stable since it was activated, go-
ing from Norway to the Netherlands in all but a few night-time hours when electricity in the
Netherlands tends to be very cheap. This means that, unless the effect of flows over NorNed is
significantly greater during price spikes, NorNed is unlikely to make much difference to electric-
ity price volatility in the Netherlands. Section 4.4 provides little evidence to support the theory
that the effect of NorNed during peak hours is greater than during off-peak hours. Given this
result, it is unlikely that NorNed is effective in eliminating significant price spikes.
The results set out in Section 6.1 suggest that, whilst NorNed has contributed to a reduction in
volatility in the Dutch electricity price, this effect has not been dramatic. The estimated 20%
reduction in residual volatility would translate into a 12% reduction in overall volatility of APX
prices given the split between explained and unexplained variation in the ARMA model of APX
prices. To put these numbers into perspective, given the properties of APX and South Norway
prices, if the residual volatility in APX prices falls by 20%, this translates into a 5% drop in the
average absolute price difference between the two markets37. This could be expected to be pro-
portional to the drop in interconnector profits resulting from the effect of the interconnector on
volatility.
Finally, the result that the operating status of NorNed has made no statistically significant dif-
ference to the volatility of the South Norway electricity price is not surprising. Since it is in the
interest of domestic reservoir generators to arbitrage any significant price spikes, the addition
of an interconnector is unlikely to either increase or decrease price volatility in that market.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses statistical inference to estimate the effect of the recently constructed intercon-
nector between the Netherlands and South Norway on the level and volatility of electricity prices
in those two markets. Its main purpose of is twofold. Firstly it is to check whether the incentives
for private transmission operators to invest in transmission capacity are below the socially opti-
mal level because additional transmission capacity by any player reduces the profits from exist-
ing transmission capacity belonging to that player. This argument relies on economies of scale
in transmission investment. Secondly it is to check whether interconnectors can be an effective
37This figure is calculated using a simulation, which may be obtained from the author on request.
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means of reducing electricity price volatility in the connected markets, something that is likely
to be increasingly important as the proportion of wind capacity in the overall EU generation mix
increases.
Whilst the focus of this paper is on the NorNed interconnector, the results are more widely ap-
plicable to the issue of connecting electricity markets by merchant interconnectors. On the first
question, the results presented here suggest that lumpiness in transmission investment is un-
likely to introduce any serious distortion into the investment decision of private transmission
operators. Since NorNed consists of two 350MW cables, one such cable can be considered to be
the smallest increment beyond which economies of scale can be expected to be small. Given the
estimated average effect on the APX price of NorNed as a whole, the vast majority of the benefits
from additional interconnector capacity is likely to be accrued to its owners. There is nothing to
suggest that merchant interconnectors with capacity on the scale of NorNed cannot be provided
competitively by private profit-maximising operators.
On the second question, the results presented here suggest that the effectiveness of merchant
interconnectors on the scale of NorNed in reducing electricity price volatility is likely to be lim-
ited. Given that NorNed connects the Dutch market to a reservoir system characterised by sta-
ble prices, NorNed represents an upper bound on such capability for interconnectors of its size.
It must therefore be concluded that interconnector capacity considerably greater than that of
NorNed would be required to achieve significant electricity price stabilisation.
It is important to note that this paper measures the static effects of the interconnector on the
two connected markets. It does not consider the dynamic effect on investment resulting from
the change in the deterministic and stochastic properties of prices. Finally, it must be noted
that these results are obtained under conditions where interconnector capacity is sold in an
explicit auction and market coupling is not implemented between the two connected markets.
It is possible that the results are driven partly by the market inefficiency resulting from failure
to implement market coupling. Since it is impossible to check that counter-factual at this stage,
the question of whether market coupling would make a difference to the results presented here
is left for future research.
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A Frequency distributions of log electricity prices
Figures 10 and 11 plot the frequency distributions of sample log APX and log South Norway
prices. These distributions are compared against a plot of a normal distribution with mean and
variance parameters calculated from the corresponding log sample price data.
Figure 10: Frequency distribution of log APX prices
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Figure 11: Frequency distribution of log South Norway prices
The distribution of log APX prices displays only a moderate amount of skewedness and kurtosis
compared to a normal distribution with identical mean and variance parameters. The distribu-
tion of the log South Norway price is skewed and displays a more significant amount of kurtosis.
It is also not characterised by a single peak in frequency around the mean.
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B List of variables
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C Autocorrelations of ARMA residuals
Figure 12: Autocorrelations of residuals from log APX price ARMA model
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Figure 13: Autocorrelations of residuals from log South Norway price ARMA model
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D Newey-West regression outputs
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E ARMA regression outputs
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F EGARCH regression outputs
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